Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots

"Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots." 2011. Quarterly Journal of Economics 126:2, pp. 649-748. Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Joshua Angrist, Susan M. Dynarski, Thomas Kane and Parag Pathak.

Abstract

Charter schools are publicly funded but operate outside the regulatory framework and collective bargaining agreements characteristic of traditional public schools. In return for this freedom, charter schools are subject to heightened accountability. This paper estimates the impact of charter school attendance on student achievement using data from Boston, where charter schools enroll a growing share of students. We also evaluate an alternative to the charter model, Boston's pilot schools. These schools have some of the independence of charter schools, but operate within the school district, face little risk of closure, and are covered by many of same collective bargaining provisions as traditional public schools. Estimates using student assignment lotteries show large and significant test score gains for charter lottery winners in middle and high school. In contrast, lottery-based estimates for pilot schools are small and mostly insignificant. The large positive lottery-based estimates for charter schools are similar to estimates constructed using statistical controls in the same sample, but larger than those using statistical controls in a wider sample of schools. The latter are still substantial, however. The estimates for pilot schools are smaller and more variable than those for charters, with some significant negative effects.

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